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demic writing" (25). So much of what 
academics refer to as the postmodern, 
then, is caught up in this migration of 
the terminologies and priorities of 
criticism into other fields of study, 
such as philosophy and historiogra-
phy, and then back into literature. 
The adoption of the rhetoric of fiction 
by other disciplines brings to life 
"otherwise potentially tedious 
details" (23) that are their stock-in-
trade but effectively forestalls efforts 
at gaining critical distance (23-24). 
The change in vocabulary modifies 
the academy's view of the world and 
this in turn motivates the proposal 
that the world has indeed changed 
(3). 
Simpson contends that the post-
modern storyteller is quite different 
from Benjamin's. The latter, by allow-
ing the listener to participate in the 
authenticity of shared experience, 
gives counsel for the future. In the 
"academic postmodernism" convinc-
ingly described by Simpson, the 
"self-enthusiasm and self-projection" 
(26) of the "autobiographical 
moment" prevails. Storytelling is lim-
ited in scope to the writer's situated-
ness or historic specificity, a state of 
affairs that dovetails nicely with the 
postmodern valorization of local 
knowledge and delegitimation of all 
metanarratives. Legitimacy is gained 
when writing about oneself, ostensi-
bly the only thing the individual is 
capable of knowing, and the particu-
lar is considered "as effectively 
imbued with the determining powers 
of the social whole" (13). 
JOSEPH FRANCESE 
Michigan State University 
Confronti con Heidegger 
a cura di Giuseppe Semerari. 
Bari: Edizioni Dedalo, 1992. 
The volume edited by Semerari 
presents a series of confrontations 
with Heidegger-confrontations 
which occur at two levels: 1) between 
the philosophers who have con-
tributed to the volume and 
Heidegger, and 2) between 
Heidegger and various philosophers 
of the western tradition. 
These confrontations set for them-
selves the task, and have the merit, of 
deepening and widening our under-
standing of the thematic and prob-
lematic ramifications of Heidegger's 
thinking throughout the history of 
philosophy-a ramification that for 
Heidegger himself was never above 
all and necessarily historical, except 
for the fact that the history of 
Western philosophy, as the history of 
metaphysics, represented for him the 
history of the concealment of the 
truth of being. 
Heidegger comes out of these con-
frontations as a philosopher moderni-
ty cannot dispense with, and yet as 
one whose thinking needs to be criti-
cally examined and gone over again. 
The volume starts with an essay 
by Valerio Bernardi on the relation-
ship between dialectical theology and 
Heideggerian ontology . The essay 
focusses on Bultmann's appropria-
tion of certain Heideggerian themes 
such as the historicity of man as 
Dasein and his potentiality-for-being 
and resoluteness, as well as the 
theme of being-towards-death. For 
Bultmann, Bernardi says, 
Heideggerian philosophy is not "a 
philosophy, but the philosophy" (8); 
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it provides the theologian with a 
method that may enable him to 
expound the evangelical message to 
the contemporary world. The debate 
on whether Heideggerian philoso-
phy-or, for that matter, any "philos-
ophy whose presuppositions are 
atheistic" (32)-can be a useful 
method for theology follows directly 
from Bultmann's position. 
After considering the criticism of 
Heim, Lowith, and Brunner, Bernardi 
concludes by stating the difficulty of 
establishing a relationship between a 
theology based on Revelation and an 
atheistic philosophy; moreover, he 
says that Heidegger's view of the 
matter was that of a subordination of 
theology to philosophy. As Bernardi 
says, "[s]uch a relationship, in which 
philosophy becomes the basis and 
the presupposition for theological 
work, is problematic for a theology 
that, like dialectic theology, has 
always sought autonomy" (32). 
The second essay, on Heidegger 
and Plotinus by Ferruccio De Natale 
is not an attempt at tracing any kind 
of relationship between the two 
thinkers, but to show that a relation-
ship is in fact impossible. 
Accordingly, the essay itself-well-
written and well-researched-is like 
a little jewel that leaves one with the 
same impression a little jewel gives: it 
is beautiful; but it is difficult to say 
more about it. Perhaps the most inter-
esting point is when De Natale dis-
cusses the concept of destiny in the 
two thinkers. There is, however, little 
wonder that, at the end of his essay, 
De Natale asks: "Was then our jour-
ney a useless one?" (his italics). And 
his answer, "Yes, especially if we 
wanted to 'show' or 'explain' or 
'prove' anything, but what we want-
ed to do was trace consonances 
between two equally great and differ-
ent thinkers" (65). And these conso-
nances, as his title says, are imperfect. 
The essay by Francesco Valerio 
(seventh and last in the collection) on 
Heidegger and Spinoza is not a jewel 
but a brick-better, a whole solid 
structure. Valerio's is indeed a very 
useful reflection on today's philo-
sophical dis/ orientation and the need 
for a re-orientation. Valerio starts by 
pointing out Heidegger's historical 
silence on Spinoza. For Valerio, 
Heidegger's harsh judgment of 
Spinoza's work-that Spinoza used 
concepts of medieval Scholasticism 
and of other philosophers who pre-
ceded him, notably Giordano Bruno, 
in a rarely acritical way-was enough 
to determine his "historical sense" 
(Valerio puts this phrase in scare 
quotes) in such a way as to "declare 
Spinoza's position as theoretically 
irrelevant within that dynamic of the 
destiny of Being as embodied in 
modern metaphysics" (213). 
Valerio' s essay is thematically con-
nected to the fourth essay in the vol-
ume, by Michele Illiceto, on the rela-
tionship between the 'self' and the 
'is' in Heidegger's ontology. The 
philosopher with whom Heidegger is 
here having a confrontation is 
Husserl, concerning the Cartesian 
cogito. · 
In Heidegger's reading of 
Descartes, Illiceto says, man enters 
the scene with the cogito; indeed, "he 
posits himself as the scene" (121 ). By 
way of overturning the sense of the 
Cartesian cogito, Heidegger establish-
es Being as the scene so that the 'is' 
becomes the place of a-letheia in 
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which "man appears" (125). For 
Husserl, Illiceto continues, the 'is' 
opens up in and through the move-
ment of the Ego; the ' self' finds 
itself-as its 'beyond' -in this move-
ment and place. For Heidegger, on 
the other hand, the 'beyond' has the 
configuration of the 'already': it is 
"the space of the 'is' understood as 
phusis" (125). What Husserl and 
Heidegger share is Husserl's dictum 
to go 'towards the things them-
selves'; that is, as Illiceto explains, not 
to the things as such, but to their self-
sameness. However, the y diverge in 
their understanding and employment 
of the uber: "in Heidegger , transcen-
dence indicates the 'beyond' that, in 
the 'There,' is the sphere in which we 
are 'already' thrown and in which we 
are in the manner of having-been-
thrown. In Husserl, instead, it indi-
cates the way to the constitution, 
through reduction, of the Ego" (130). 
For this reason, Heidegger's ontology 
becomes an ontology of impossibility. 
Illiceto's conclusion is that 
Heidegger leaves us with two funda-
mental impossibilities: the first is that 
man has no access to temporality; the 
second, that he is condemned to the 
absence of himself. In this sense, 
Illiceto proposes a move away "from 
a relation [between the 'is' and the 
'self'] founded on transcendence to a 
relation founded on intentionality" 
(139; brackets mine). A return to 
Husserl? Not quite so. Illiceto ends 
his essay by referring to E. Bloch's 
'ontology of possibility' -one which 
Heidegger, in establishing a 'possibil-
ity of ontology,' has indeed not pro-
vided. He reassumes Heidegger's 
ontology as follows: "man configures 
himself as a possibility that is funda-
mentally unable to be the possibility 
he is" (140). 
The essay of Domenica Discipio, 
third in the volume, is on Heidegger 
and Freud. As in the case with 
Plotinus and Spinoza, Heidegger's 
relation to Freud is not direct or 
explicit. Perhaps, a reason for this can 
be found, Discipio suggests, in 
Heidegger's declaration, in Being and 
Time, of "the need to operate a cri-
tique of traditional thinking that, in 
its historical forms, has covered and 
concealed the essential historicity of 
Dasein and of its Being" (70). 
To draw a confrontation between 
Heidegger and Freud, Discipio starts 
with a discussion of Heidegger's 
Zollikoner Seminiire (1969) on the 
meaning of the word consciousness 
(Bewufltsein), where, for the first time, 
Heidegger "evokes" Freud, "so accu-
rately ignored in his whole philo-
sophical reflection" (69). Discipio 
goes through M. Bartels's and W. J. 
Richardson's works on the connec-
tions between Heidegger ' s thinking 
and Freud's psychoanalytic theory. 
Both authors ask the question as to 
whether it is possible to apply 
Heidegger ' s onto-existential analysis 
to Freud's theory of human personal-
ity. However, by way of overturning 
these questions, Discipio is interested 
in whether it is possible to use psy-
choanalysis for a rethinking of 
Heidegger's thought in an attempt to 
understand why Heidegger might 
have wanted to focus "constantly," 
and "only and always" (95), on the 
Being of Dasein. 
After recalling Heidegger's 
emphasis on the primacy of ontology 
(here Discipio reminds us of the most 
fundamental metaphysical question: 
reviews 413 
Why is there anything rather than 
nothing?), she goes through a series 
of similar themes in Heidegger and 
Freud, of which the most important is 
the theme of the Es as what "gives 
existence to man" in Freud, and as 
the Es of the Es gibt in Heidegger. For 
the latter, Discipio explains, "the 
being of man is concealed in the 
depths of the Es" (97). Inasmuch as 
the Es gibt Sein constitutes a des-
tiny-for it makes man what he is-
thinking moves from the Es to the 
gibt, to the giving itself as an "act of 
love" not different from the libido of 
the Es in Freud, that is, Eros. 
Consequently, Discipio speaks of 
Eros and Thanatos as the two funda-
mental principles of Freud's theory, 
and Thanatos is to be found in 
Heidegger's Being-towards-death. 
However, Discipio also says that, 
notwithstanding their similarities, 
there is in Freud, particularly in rela-
tion to the death instinct, a departure 
from a possible analogy with 
Heidegger. 
Mauro G. Minervini's essay on 
Heidegger and Hegel (fourth essay in 
the volume) is an analysis of 
Heidegger's understanding of phe-
nomenology as phenomena-logy, that 
is, literally, as logic in the Hegelian 
sense-a sense that, according to 
Heidegger, Hegel receives directly 
from Aristotle. The essay also con-
tains a good discus sion of certain 
central themes in Kant's Critique of 
Pure Reason, necessar y to an under-
standing of Heidegger's interpreta-
tion of Hegel's concept of time as 
"constitutive of logical labor" (161). 
Finally, Giuseppe Semerari' s essay 
deals with the relationship between 
Heidegger and Parmenides and, 
essentially, with the question of man 
as being (entity). Semerari starts by 
clearing the way from the two cur-
rent and opposite interpretations of 
Heidegger's thinking as either 
humanistic (with an emphasis on 
anthropocentrism) or anti-humanistic 
(with an emphasis on the death of 
man). Then he draws an important 
distinction between two possible 
philosophical models to approach the 
question of man and his cosmic dis-
position: either a Parmenidean or a 
Protagorean model. The former 
grounds itself on the fundamental 
undecidability of man's destiny by 
man himself; the latter, on the idea of 
self-responsibility which follows 
from Protagoras's discovery that man 
is 'the measure of all things ' (168-69). 
Obviously, Heidegger works with 
and within the Parmenidean model. 
From here, Semerari moves to the 
concept of man's "facticity" and to 
the hermeneutics of facticity-that is, 
Semerari says quoting Gadamer's 
"felicitous definition", which I para-
phrase- the fact that man cannot 
conceptualize his existence. Semerari 
identifies Heidegger's Parmenidism 
in the fact that, in Heidegger, man 
himself is not freedom but "the place 
in which freedom liberates itself" 
(180), for freedom is Being. Unlike 
the Protagorean model, in 
Parmenides, it is not "man who has 
___, but _ has man as its determina-
tion, as its There (Da) ... " (181). Man is 
a project, but the project is tautologi-
cal-here one finds a relation 
between Semerari's and Illiceto's 
essays-for it is the "choice of what 
man already is by virtue of his being-
thrown in the way in which he has 
been thrown" (182). 
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Semerari's essay-but this is true 
of all the others-is mainly con-
cerned with the issue of freedom and 
destiny, and thus with what today, in 
the era of technology and danger the-
orized by Heidegger, still can and 
must be thought. By way of con-
fronting Heidegger on the ground of 
his confrontations with other thinkers 
of the Western tradition, the whole 
volume becomes an important source 
of critical orientations for the future 
of thinking, as well as a serious 
reflection on themes whose problem-
atics have not yet been exhausted. 
BRUNO GULLI 
CUNY Graduate Center, New York 
II gioco dei limiti. L'idea di 
esistenza in Nietzsche. 
Furio Semerari. 
Bari: Laterza, 1993. 224 pp. 
For the past forty years, Nietzsche 
has been a major interlocutor in con-
temporary Italian critical thought. He 
been subjected, in nearly chronologi-
cal succession, to compelling inter-
pretations by existentialists, struc-
turalists, Marxists, thinkers of the 
negative and of difference, and 
hermeneuticians . Some readings, in 
particular, have become witness to 
, and icons of specific intellectual-cul-
tural moods, and here we can briefly 
recall the influential monographs by 
Gianni Vattimo, Antonio Penzo, 
Giangiorgio Pasqualotto, Giuseppe 
Masini, Massimo Cacciari, Giorgio 
Colli. In each case, Nietzsche's pecu-
liar textuality was made to support 
the thesis that his Overman was a 
model for liberation and emancipa-
tion, or that he was systematically 
misrepresented for the early part of 
the century, especially in Germany. 
On another front, Nietzsche's notion 
of difference manifested significantly 
disparate traits to the Italians than it 
did to the French; thus he was read as 
the ultimate hermeneutician of end-
less interpretation or, on yet another 
reading, as the last expression of an 
utterly fragmented subject(ivity) of 
metaphysical thought, the announcer 
of achieved nihilism. Of course, 
artists and writers also have dug 
inside the endlessly configurable 
Nachlass, especially in the seventies 
and through the eighties. One aspect 
which recurs often is the elusive rap-
port between body and meaning, life 
and art, the dynamic of the creative 
impulse, life itself as constantly 
changing positions; "gaming", as we 
might say with Lyotard. 
Fulvio Semerari' s book intends to 
re-read the Colli-Montinari corpus in 
terms of a problematic concept which 
is perhaps not sufficiently thematized 
by Nietzsche himself, at least explicit-
ly, but which can serve as the back-
ground web or linkage among a con-
stellation of other assertions and 
divagations only apparently contra-
dictory or unrelated. This is the con-
cept of limit , which according to 
Semerari takes on several meanings 
and on the basis of which we can fur-
ther penetrate and pay homage to the 
thinker who refuses to be, who can-
not be, categorized, and seems des-
tined to spur and produce ever-dif-
ferent interpretations . Beginning with 
Karl Lowith's observation that 
Nietzsche's "travailled thinking is 
